Effects of Corruption on Tertiary School Enrolment in Africa by Ouedraogo, Idrissa et al.
Journal of Education and Practice                                                                                                                                                      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1735 (Paper)   ISSN 2222-288X (Online)  
Vol.11, No.29, 2020 
 
52 
Effects of Corruption on Tertiary School Enrolment in Africa 
 
Idrissa Ouedraogo1,2*      Issa Dianda3      Constant Fouopi Djiogap2 
1.Institute of Governance, Humanities and Social Sciences, The Pan African University, Yaoundé 
2.Faculty of Economics and Management, The University of Yaoundé II, Cameroon 
3.Department of Economics and Management, Thomas Sankara University 
 
Abstract 
This paper empirically analyses the effects of control of corruption on tertiary school enrolment in a panel of 44 
African countries over the period 1996-2016. Using system Generalized method of moments and controlling for a 
large number of other determinants of tertiary school enrolment, it finds that, over the sample period, control of 
corruption has a substantial positive effect. This is probably because control of corruption increases public 
spending level and effectiveness on tertiary education, increases the return on tertiary education, and ultimately 
fosters the access to tertiary education specially the poorer strata in the African economies. In the light of this 
result, an intensification of control of corruption in Africa is imperative to improve the tertiary school enrolment. 
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1. Introduction 
In a knowledge and competitive economy, tertiary education plays a key role in the process of economic growth 
and sustainable development. It leads to a more entrepreneurial and civic society (Asamoah & Mackin, 2015). 
Moreover, a labour force with a tertiary education level is more productive and able to adapt technologies and 
innovation (Bloom, Canning, Chan, & Luca, 2014). Similarly, the structural transformation is strongly associated 
with the labour force benefiting from tertiary education (Darvas, Gao, Shen, & Bawany, 2017). Therefore, tertiary 
education can make an important contribution for building a stronger society, ending extreme poverty, and 
boosting shared prosperity (World Bank, 2017). At individual level, tertiary education leads to robust private 
returns to graduates and the average returns exceed those at the primary and secondary level (Montenegro & 
Patrinos, 2014). The positive effect of tertiary education on economic growth is well established in empirical 
literature in mixed panel studies (Chatterji,1998) and evaluations based on African countries (Gyimah-Brempong, 
Paddison, & Mitiku, 2006; Okuneye & Adelowokan, 2014). 
In view of this pivotal role, the factors determining the tertiary school enrolment have been the subject of 
reflection in the literature. In recent decades, corruption has been identified as a key determinant of tertiary 
education. Corruption can be defined as the abuse of authority for personal as well as material gain (Heyneman, 
2004). In tertiary education sphere, it includes, among other, embezzlement, patronage, cronyism, sexual 
misconduct, illicit payments in recruitment and admissions, nepotism in tenured postings, bribery in on-campus 
accommodation and grading, political and corporate undue influence in research, plagiarism, ghost authorship and 
editorial misconduct in academic journals (Osipian, 2007; Transparency International, 2013). But why might there 
be an effect of corruption on tertiary education? 
There are several channels through which corruption influences tertiary education. Firstly, corruption acts as 
an added tax, and therefore is a barrier to access to tertiary education, especially for students from poorer strata of 
society (Borcan, Lindahl, & Mitrut, 2017). By limiting access to tertiary education, corruption reduces its 
enrolment rates. 
Secondly, corruption lowers the return on education, discourages further education and reducing the 
enrolment rates. Education is as a component of human capital and considered as an investment (Becker, 1964). 
The trade-off between costs and benefits determines the optimal number of years of schooling. Corruption 
increases the uncertainty of success in the labour market after graduating and reduce the economic rate of return 
on tertiary education investment by public institutions and individual students (Duerrenberger & Warning, 2018; 
Transparency International, 2013). Likewise, corruption contributes to the collapse of values by negatively 
influencing the accumulation of human capital. It discourages individuals from fully investing in tertiary education 
and pursuing it to the end because there is no opportunity offered to them to benefit from these long-term 
investments (Sen, 2015). It undermines incentives that motivate young people to work hard while teaching them 
that there are easier ways to achieve success (Rumyantseva, 2005). Seka (2013) argues that in an environment 
where corruption reigns, the attraction of easy gain by unsavoury practices of less deserving students can lead the 
most deserving ones to halt studies quickly to join the gang of rich mafia, and this, by pure mimicry, with regard 
to the expected immediate benefits. In such environment, very talented students, who otherwise could have pushed 
further their studies, suddenly dropout when they compare the level of wellbeing of those who are well educated 
with that of those who are not but enriched through corruption. They join the later in their corruptive activities. 
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Seka (2013) also notes that in the public service, some agents in certain functions do not want promotion. They 
manage not to take exams that could allow them to rise in rank, because this would prevent them from having 
access to annuity situations. Therefore, they refuse to do continuous training in order to increase their human 
capital, refusing knowledge, perfection and remaining in mediocrity. 
Thirdly, corruption affects tertiary education through its effect on public spending allocation and tax revenue. 
In a corrupt sphere, the existence of rent seeking creates distortions in the allocation of public spending (Hessami, 
2014). The sectors conducive to corrupt transactions and for which the rent exists and can be easily extracted and 
concealed are prioritized. Education sector offer fewer opportunities for rent-seeking and is not prioritized 
(Hessami, 2014; Mauro, 1998). In the same vein, high level of corruption leads to the evasion of taxes and 
consequently reduce the volume of funds available to finance education. 
 Lastly, a country with limited corruption offers quality services including those related to education. For 
example, public spending on primary education becomes more effective in increasing primary education 
attainment in countries with lower corruption (Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008). 
However, moral condemnation of corruption should not prevent the point that, in economic terms, its 
harmfulness is not necessarily proven. For example, Huntington and Fukuyama (2006) and Leff (1964) seem to 
see benefits in corruption. Indeed, corruption can reduce state constraints by speeding up transactions. Bribes can 
be a mechanism to overcome overly centralized government bureaucracy, red tape and waiting times. Bribe can 
be an effective solution to acquiring an education service that would otherwise not be available and accessible. 
For example, in a country where individuals and entrepreneur want to build schools, in an overly centralized 
government bureaucracy, corruption may speed up the possibility for them to be able to build their schools in a 
reasonable time allowing students to go in those schools. 
In Africa, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), tertiary enrollment rate is still the lowest in the world. 
According to World Bank statistics, the tertiary enrolment rate across SSA in 2018 is 9.38%, or almost the world 
average in 1970 and well below the world average of 38.04% (World Bank, 2020a). At the same time, SSA, with 
an average of 32 out of 100 has the lowest-scoring region on the corruption perception index in 2019 (Transparency 
International, 2020). The Global Corruption Barometer Africa finds more than one in four people (28%) who 
accessed public services, such as education, paid a bribe in the preceding year. This equates to approximately 130 
million citizens in the 35 African countries surveyed. A majority of African citizens (55%) think that corruption 
increased in their country in the previous 12 months, while far fewer think it declined (23%) (Pring & Vrushi, 
2019). 
The low rate of tertiary education in Africa, combined with the prevalence of corruption legitimizes an 
empirical investigation of the link between corruption and the rate of tertiary education. This paper explores the 
effects of corruption on tertiary school enrolment rate. It is in line with the work of Seka (2013) who highlighted 
the negative effect of corruption on tertiary education in a sample of 38 developed and developing countries using 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) in a cross-sectional data in 1998. Our paper differs from his study in four ways. First, 
we assess the link in a more homogeneous area that is Africa. Second, we study the effect of corruption on tertiary 
education not only among males and females jointly but also separately for females. Third, we use more recent 
data spanning from 1996-2016. Fourth, we use the system Generalized method of moments (system GMM) 
estimates proposed by la Blundell and Bond (1998) to account for endogeneity problems. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. While section 2 describes the methodology used for 
empirical investigation, section 3 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Materials and method 
2.1. Empirical Model Specification 
We test the hypothesis that corruption is detrimental to both tertiary school enrolment and female tertiary school 
enrolment. To do this, we estimate the effect of control of corruption on tertiary school enrolment in African 
economies. We estimate the following econometric model:  
 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 , 𝛼 𝜌𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 , 𝜆 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 , 𝛾𝑋 , 𝜂 𝜇 𝜀 , 1   
In equation (1), t=1…,23 and i=1,…,44 denote time and country, respectively. The variable ,i t
Educ
 
represents our measure of tertiary school enrolment from the World Bank (2020a) World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Its lagged value , 1i t
Educ  , the dynamic specification, is included on the right-hand side to accommodate 
dynamic accumulation of tertiary education. In addition, tertiary education may exhibit inertia in the sense that the 
current value may be determined by the past value of the variable because the tertiary education policies 
implemented take time to generate results. The variable ,i t
Corr
denotes control of corruption from the World Bank 
(2020b) Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 is a set of control variables including public spending on 
tertiary education as a percentage of GDP, urban population, foreign direct investment net inflows as percentage 
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of GDP, inflation rate, GDP per capita, Domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks, population growth 




 denote a full set of country and time fixed effects, 
respectively. ,i t

 is the error term.  
 
2.2. Presentation of variables 
The dependent variable is the gross tertiary school enrolment rate. In addition to the tertiary enrolment rate, which 
covers male and female jointly, we also use the female tertiary enrolment rate. This is because the education of 
girls has traditionally been neglected in many African countries. At higher education level, SSA has the lowest 
gender parity index (0.75) in 2028 while the others regions have a well-balanced tertiary gender parity index (more 
than 1) (World Bank, 2020a).  
Using the female tertiary enrolment rate as an alternative dependent variable enables us to gauge whether and 
to what extent corruption has been detrimental to this demographic group in particular.  
The explanatory variable of interest is the control of corruption from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
of the World Bank (2020b). It is the only indicators which covers all African countries and is the most widely used 
in the empirical literature. It is also easily accessible. For our variables, definitions, descriptive statistics and data 
sources are given in Table A1 of appendices. 
We run the main specification of our regression without controls. Following the literature, we use many 
variables to control for the effects of factors that are potentially important determinants of tertiary education. These 
controls are added progressively to the main specification. This can be served as robustness check for the effects 
of control of corruption on tertiary school enrolment. We first control for government expenditure per student in 
tertiary education as a percentage of GDP per capita. Countries with higher expenditure per student in the tertiary 
education tend to have lesser school enrolment rates because this is likely to be a cost.  
We also control for urbanisation rate. In general, in urban areas, access to education is better than in rural 
areas (Baldacci, Clements, Gupta, & Cui, 2008). In particular, access to tertiary education is usually possible in 
urban areas since most universities and others tertiary education institutions are mostly located in urban areas. In 
line with this idea, we hypothesize that urbanization is favourable to tertiary school enrolment in Africa. 
Additionally, we control for Foreign direct investment (FDI), net inflows in percentage of GDP per capita. In 
the empirical literature, some authors have shown that net capital inflows improve tertiary completion rates at the 
level of host countries (Egger et al., 2010; Zhuang, 2013) while others found that increase in FDI has a negative 
effect on tertiary education (Wang, 2011; Zhuang ,2016). We expect foreign direct investment net inflow to 
decrease tertiary school enrolment in Africa.  
We also add inflation rate as another control variable. Berg (1981) studies the effect of inflation on tertiary 
education and argues that it negatively affects the return on investment in education. Heylen, Schollaert, Everaert 
and Pozzi (2003) study the effects of inflation on human capital formation and find that rising inflation 
fundamentally favours human capital formation. However, the effect of inflation on human capital development 
is negative when the inflation rate exceeds the 100% threshold. For an inflation rate below 15%, its effect is not 
significant. We expect inflation to have a negative effect on tertiary school enrolment rates.  
We control of GDP per capita because it has a positive effect on schooling (Mincer, 1996). The increase in 
per capita income gives citizens more leeway to invest in higher education given its cost. 
Domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks is also added as a control variable. It is a proxy for 
borrowing constraints. Cameron and Taber (2004) show that credit market restrictions do not generate large 
inefficiencies in the US education market. Therefore, partnership-based policies to improve access to the credit 
market would not have had a significant effect on the education acquired by individuals. Chein and Pinto (2017) 
find no evidence of credit constraint in the education decision at the tertiary education level in Brazil. However, 
Mimoun (2008) estimates the effect of credit constraints on tertiary education enrolment and show that credit 
market restrictions have a negative effect on investment in human capital. We expect to have positive effects on 
access to credit on tertiary school enrolment in African economies. Where low-income households have broad 
access to formal and informal credit markets, their children are not forced to work to help out at home. They can 
enrol in school and go as far as possible in their education. 
We also include population growth rate. Lower population growth can lead to a higher tertiary enrolment rate. 
This is because both parents and societies face a trade-off between child quantity and quality: The lower the 
number of children in a family, the more they are usually able to invest into each of them (Becker & Lewis,1973; 
Hanushek, 1992). 
Finally, we use ethnic fractionalisation as a proxy of ethnic diversity. Churchill, Madhoo and Nath (2020) 
also examine the effects of ethnic diversity on education in 30 Indian States and 557 districts. Their findings 
suggest development-enhancing effects of ethnic diversity on education.  We also expect ethnic diversity to 
favourably affect tertiary education in Africa.  
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Our panel annual data covers 44 African countries (for a list of countries, see Appendix B) over the time 
period 1996-2016. With respect to both countries and years, the size of our sample is determined by data 
availability only.   
There is a substantial variation in both the control of corruption measure and the two enrolment variables. 
Specifically, on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale, control of corruption ranges from -1.723 to 1.217 (Table A1). The tertiary 
enrolment rate ranges from 0.321% to 42.629%, while the female tertiary enrolment rate ranges from 0.147% to 
53.6%.  
 
Notes : 44 African countries. Data from the period 1996 to 2016. The regression represented by the fitted 
line yields a coefficient on control of corruption of 0.515 (robust standard error = 0.050), R2= 0.339. 
Source: Authors usind data from WGI and WDI (World Bank, 2020a,2020b) 
Figure 1: Control of corruption and tertiary enrolment rate in African economies, 1996-2016 
The bivariate associations between control of corruption and tertiary enrolment rates and female tertiary 
enrolment rates in figures 1 and 2 use country averages over the sample period 1996-2016 and show a positive 
relationship. Over the sample period, African countries that have a good control of corruption tend to have a higher 
tertiary enrolments rates, both among male and female combined as well as among female only.  However, a 
counter-intuitive finding should be noted among the 5 countries with the highest tertiary education rates. The 3 
North African countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt) have higher levels of corruption and higher education rates. 
Meanwhile, the two countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Mauritius, South Africa), although having relatively low 
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Notes : 44 african countries. Data from the period 1996 to 2016. The regression represented by the fitted 
line yields a coefficient on control of corruption of 0.807 (robust standard error = 0.075), R2= 0.384. 
Source: Authors using data from WGI and WDI (World Bank, 2020a,2020b) 
Figure 2. Control of corruption and female tertiary enrolment rate in African economies, 1996-2016 
 
2.3.   Estimation technique 
For the estimation technique, we use a GMM estimator to control for possible endogeneity bias due to reverse 
causality, and measurements errors. For example, causality may not only run from control of corruption to 
education but also vice versa. Education can also affect corruption. According to Gupta et al. (2001), a low level 
of education could also create an environment conducive to corruption. Conversely, when a population is better 
educated, it may offer a better chance to control corruption. It is also generally accepted that more educated citizens 
are less tolerant of corruption (Swamy et al., 2001; Truex, 2011). Therefore, as argue Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2015), education is a powerful tool in the fight against corruption. In this vein, Cheung and Chan (2008) state that 
as the number of people participating in tertiary education increased, the incidence of corruption occurring in the 
countries decreased. This is also supported by Lipset (1960) in his theory of modernization. There are also possible 
measurement errors of macroeconomic variables presented in section 5. 
Using GMM estimator means we take first differences of the regression equation to purge time-invariant 
fixed effects. We then choose suitably lagged levels of the variables as internal instruments. Following Blundell 
and Bond (1998), to improve the finite sample properties of the estimator, we augment the equation in first 
differences with that in levels where lagged first differences serve as instruments. The validity of the second set 
of instruments rests on the assumption that changes in the instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with i. 
Following Blundell and Bond (1998), we report two specification tests, namely, the Hansen (1982) test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which evaluates the validity of the instruments, and a test that the error term exhibits 
no second-order serial correlation (see table 1 and 2). 
Following the advice by Roodman (2009a) we add time fixed to control for correlation across individuals in 
the error term. Finally, we apply Windmeijer’s (2005) correction to our standards errors to correct the finite sample 
bias in the two-step standard errors. As previously stated, we control for most major determinants of school 
enrolment that have been found in the previous literature. We did this by including them progressively in our 
preliminary specification.  
During the estimation of equation (1), as variables are added, the number of countries decreases: some 
countries do not have many observations for some variables. We would have liked to make the estimates taking 
into account other heterogeneities (apart from the differentiation of total tertiary education versus tertiary education 
of women) such as the sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa declination, unfortunately the availability of data, 
does not allow for this. In addition, following the technical condition of use of GMM set by Roodman (2009a, 
2009b) who points out that this method is suitable for panel data structures in which the study period (T) is shorter 
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3. Results and discussion  
The results of our regressions are presented in table 1 for both male and female tertiary school enrolment and in 
table 2 for female tertiary school enrolment only. 
Table 1: System-GMM estimates of control of corruption on tertiary school enrolment in Africa, 1996-2016 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 





















































































































Domestic credit provided to the private sector 















































Observations 456 233 233 138 125 125 120 119 117 117 
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Number of instruments 13 10 11 20 13 14 15 17 18 19 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 0.246 0.243 0.378 0.419 0.117 0.113 0.240 0.248 0.250 0.151 
Hansen p-value 0.389 0.633 0.610 0.424 0.337 0.194 0.354 0.412 0.380 0.664 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses.  They are corrected by using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample procedure. 
*** p < 0.01, significant at 1%; ** p < 0.05, significant at 5%, * p < 0.1 significant at 10%. Controls are added 
progressively and cumulatively.  
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Before we discuss the results from our regressions, let us briefly take a look at the validity of our model. We 
can see from tables 1 and 2 that lagged dependent variable is statistically significant for all regressions showing 
that a dynamic specific was suitable. This shows that accumulation of tertiary education is dynamic and that tertiary 
education exhibits inertia because current tertiary education may be determined by the past value of this education 
since tertiary education policies implemented take time to generate results. In all regressions, we can also see that 
the Hansen test p-value indicates the validity of the overidentifying restrictions: Hansen-p value ≥10. Moreover, 
there is no evidence for second -order autocorrelation: AR2-p value ≥10.  The number of countries is also more 
than the number of instruments, indicating that there is no problem of instruments proliferation. 
Concerning our multivariate regressions shown in table 1 and 2, while column 1 from table 1 presents the 
results from our baseline specification, columns 2 to 10 present the results from our robustness checks. While table 
1 reports the results from the regressions to explain the tertiary school enrolment rate, table 2 reports the results 
from the regressions to explain the female tertiary school enrolment rate. Each regression to explain the female 
tertiary school enrolment rate in table 2 uses the same control variables as the corresponding regression to explain 
the tertiary enrolment rate presented in table 1. 
In each regression, the coefficient on control of corruption is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that, over 1996-2016, control of corruption has a favourable effect on both the tertiary and the female tertiary 
enrolment rates. Our regression results corroborate the hypothesis that corruption is detrimental to tertiary 
education and female tertiary education. As explained in the introduction (section 1), as an added tax, corruption 
can act as a barrier for poor people to access to tertiary education. In addition, corruption can negatively affect 
tertiary school enrolment through its deleterious effect on public spending allocation and tax revenue. For example, 
when a public official misappropriates public money intended for the construction of academic infrastructure, this 
negatively affects the provision of tertiary education and thus limits the possibility for people to have access to 
this education. Furthermore, corruption can also lower the return on education and discourages further education, 
thus reducing the enrolment rates. In a corrupt environment characterised by the lure of easy gain; students lose 
interest in continuing their studies. 
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Table 2: System-GMM estimates of control of corruption on female tertiary school enrolment in Africa, 1996-
2016 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
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Ethnic fractionalisation  
























Observations 404 207 207 128 116 116 111 110 108 108 
Number of countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Number of instruments 7 10 20 15 8 18 16 22 24 22 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 0.495 0.794 0.577 0.608 0.720  0.883 0.831 0.895 0.879 0.906 
Hansen p-value 0.175 0.417  0.636 0.528 0.629 0.202  0.572 0.488 0.658 0.548 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. They are corrected by using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample procedure. 
*** p < 0.01, significant at 1%; ** p < 0.05, significant at 5%, * p < 0.1 significant at 10%. Controls are added 
progressively and cumulatively. All regressions contain a constant term. Each regression of female tertiary 
enrolment rate uses the same control variables as the regression of tertiary enrolment rate presented in the same 
column in Table 1.  
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Talented students who initially would like to study for long periods of time are hastily judged to be too long 
when they compare the standard of living of those who have already done so with those who have not but are rich 
in corruption. The high drop-out rate that has become commonplace in African universities can be explained by 
corruption. Our result is in line with Seka (2013) who finds corruption to be detrimental to tertiary school 
enrolment in a sample of 38 developed and developing countries using OLS in a cross-sectional data from 1998. 
They are also in accordance with results by Dridi (2014). This author demonstrates in a sample of 85 developed 
and developing countries under the period 1980-2002 that access to secondary schooling is significantly and 
negatively affected by increased corruption. Our results corroborate those of Duerrenberger and Warning (2018) 
who, using data from 88 developing countries from 2005 to 2012, found that corruption negatively correlates with 
expected years of schooling. 
Although our results accord with other studies, our paper adds to this literature in several respects, most 
importantly by using system GMM to account for potential endogeneity bias, a much larger number of controls 
and by estimating the effect of corruption on tertiary education not only among males and females jointly but also 
separately for females in Africa in a more recent data spanning from 1996-2016. 
Finally, we briefly comment on the estimates for the control variables (tables 1 and 2). Interestingly, very few 
of them are statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of additional controls or the tertiary and female 
tertiary education. One of the most robust results among the controls is that, during our sample period, ethnic 
fractionalisation is associated with a lower tertiary enrolment rate. Replacing ethnic fractionalisation by religion 
fractionalisation does not qualitatively change the result. This suggest that cultural diversity unfavourably affects 
education. This result does not accord with Alesina et al. (2003) and Gruber (2005) who suggest that, in their cases, 
religious pluralism might favourably affect education. 
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the effects of corruption on tertiary school enrolment in Africa. The analyse uses annual 
data on a panel of 44 countries over the time period 1996-2016 and system GMM estimator. The estimated effects 
suggest that corruption hinders tertiary school enrolment in the region. This finding persists if we use more controls 
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and female tertiary school enrolment rates. For countries in the region, this finding implies that controlling 
corruption will probably allow many people to access tertiary education.  If a government in the region decides to 
increase access in tertiary education, it seems relevant to implement successful control of corruption policies. 
 
Appendices  
Table A1: Variables sources and definitions  
Variable  Definition  Obs. Mean  Std. dev. Min.  Max.  Source  
Tertiary school 
enrolment rate (%)  
Boys and girls enrolled in tertiary 
education, regardless of age, as a 
percentage of girls in the age group 
that officially corresponds to this 
level of education. 
589 9.010 9.194 .321 42.629 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Female tertiary 
school 
 enrolment rate 
(%)  
Girls enrolled in tertiary education, 
regardless of age, as a percentage of 
girls in the age group that officially 
corresponds to this level of education. 
535 8.617 10.837 .147 53.600 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Control of 
corruption  
It measures the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, as 
well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. It takes values 
from -2.5 to +2.5 with a higher level 
indicating more effort of to control 
corruption. 
924 -.547 .588 -1.723 1.217 World 
Bank 
(2020b)   
GDP per capita, 
(constant 2011 
international $) 
It is GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity rates.  
910 3764.489 3595.059 508.334 19590.61 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Population growth 
rate (%)  
Annual growth rate of the population; 
decimal fraction. 
919   2.428 .954 -.617   8.118 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Government 
expenditure per 
student, tertiary (% 
of GDP per capita) 
Government expenditure per student 
is the average general government 
expenditure per student in tertiary 
education, expressed as a percentage 
of GDP per capita. 
271 217.326 312.823   .034 2489.753 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Trade openness  Sum of exports and imports of goods 
and services as a decimal fraction of 
GDP. 
864 69.486 33.730 17.859 311.354 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Urbanisation rate  People living in urban areas as a decimal 
fraction of the total population. 
919 37.952 15.492 7.412 71.459 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Table A1 (Continued) 
Variable  Definition  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max.  Source  
Foreign direct 
investment,  
net inflows (% of 
GDP)  
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 % or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that 
of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, 
and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments. This series shows net inflows (new 
investment inflows less disinvestment) in the 
reporting economy from foreign investors, and is 
divided by GDP. 
584 10.328 16.207 -8.703 103.337 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Domestic credit 
provided to the 
private sector by 
banks (% of GDP) 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks refers to 
financial resources provided to the private sector 
by other depository corporations (deposit taking 
corporations except central banks), such as through 
loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade 
credits and other accounts receivable, that establish 
a claim for repayment. For some countries these 
claims include credit to public enterprises. 
899 36.790 26.312 1.855 143.656 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
The index of ethnic fractionalization that captures  
the probability that two randomly selected persons  
from a given country will not belong to the same  
ethnic group.  
903 .629 .249 0 .930 Alesina 
et al. 
(2003) 
Inflation rate  Annual change in the consumer price index; 
decimal fraction. 
  823 15.949 11.455 -60.496 98.224 World 
Bank 
(2020a)   
Appendix B. List of countries  
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South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Comoros, 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia.  
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